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In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, 
subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. 
We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and 
strategy-proof. For the case of more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is 
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 1 Introduction
Consider an economy with one public good, one private good and with a
ﬁnite number of individuals each with private information about his prefer-
ences. The assumption that these preferences are representable by an utility
function which is linear in the private good - i.e. a Transferrable Utility (TU)
d o m a i n -i sm a d ei nal a r g en u m b e ro fp a p e r sc o n c e r n i n gi n c e n t i v e si np u b l i c
good economies (e.g. Clarke [5], Groves [8], Groves and Loeb [9], Green and
Laﬀont [11], Laﬀont and Maskin [15], Walker [27], Hurwicz and Walker [13],
and Beviá and Corchón [3]).
O n eo ft h er e a s o n sf o rt h ep o p u l a r i t yo ft h i sc l a s so fp r e f e r e n c e si st h a t
they are very handy: The eﬃcient quantity of the public good is determined
independently of the private good allocated to individuals -thus, it makes
sense to speak of the optimal level of the public good independently of how
it is ﬁnanced- and the distribution of the private good is independent of
eﬃciency. Unfortunately, once we move away from a TU domain all these
properties are lost: The eﬃcient quantity of the public good depends on
the consumption of the private good and therefore how the public good is
ﬁnanced matters for eﬃciency.
In this paper we consider the incentives problem in a domain in which,
possibly, eﬃciency and distribution of the private good can not be separated.
Our main concern is to verify the existence of allocation mechanisms that
satisfy certain desirable properties such as eﬃciency, nondictorship, envy-
freeness or individual rationality, in which each agent’s space of preferences
depends on a parameter that belongs to an arbitrary open subset of the
real line and, for each agent, truthfully reporting his true preferences is a
dominant strategy, i.e. strategy-proofness.
Having lost the insights obtained in the case where utility is linear in the
private good we approach this problem with the help of diﬀerential calculus
so we assume that all the relevant functions are smooth. This assumption
is just a little bit stronger than continuity because continuous functions can
be approximated by diﬀerentiable functions (see Bartle [1, p. 172]), and
continuity seems like a sensible requirement in mechanism design (see e.g.,
Peleg [20] or Postlewaite and Wettstein [21]). Diﬀerentiability has been used
extensively in the literature dealing with incentives in a TU domain.
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h a tw i t ht w oa g e n t s ,e ﬃciency, non-dictatorship and
strategy-proofness are incompatible in any domain that includes an open set
in which preferences are representable by an utility function that is additively
3separable between the public and the private good, in which the subutility
that refers to the public good takes certain form and in which the marginal
rate of substitution between the public and the private good is a strictly
monotonic function of the type of the agent, i.e. the so called single-crossing
property of the indiﬀerence curves (Proposition 1).
When the number of agents is arbitrary, we have to strengthen the re-
quirement of non-dictatorship. Our next result says that with more than
two agents, eﬃciency, strategy-proofness and envy-freeness (see Foley [7])
are all incompatible requirements in any domain that includes an open set
of preferences satisfying the single crossing property (Proposition 2). When
envy-freeness is substituted by individual rationality we need a requirement
of regularity -that implies the single-crossing property holds locally- but
we only need to assume that the outcome is eﬃcient for a speciﬁcp r o ﬁle
of preferences. With these assumptions in hand we show that there is no
strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism deﬁned in any open set
(Proposition 3).1
We stress that the domains of preferences used in this paper can include
those representable by quasi-linear utility functions. Therefore, our results
are also applicable to TU domains.
We now review other contributions to incentive compatibility in NTU
domains with public goods. Ledyard and Roberts [17] showed that with
two agents, there is no incentive compatible individually rational and eﬃ-
cient mechanism in a domain that include certain utility functions. Saijo
[22] obtained a similar result strengthening the assumption of the domain
but imposing a weaker individual rationality assumption and considering n
person economies. Serizawa [25, pp. 503-8], building on Moulin [19], showed
that there is no incentive compatible mechanism deﬁn e di nt h ed o m a i no f
all continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave utility functions that is
Individually Rational, Non-Exploitative, Non-Bossy2 and Eﬃcient. Finally
1These results are similar to those in TU domains but the intuition behind them is
diﬀerent: In TU domains, the usual route ([13, p. 694] and [27, pp.1527-8]) is to show
that Groves mechanisms are the only strategy-proof mechanisms ([10] and [12]) but they
seldom balance the budget. The proof by Beviá and Corchón [3] hinges on the fact that
the eﬃcient quantity of the public good is independent of the consumption of the private
good. These routes can not be taken in our case.
2In a Non-Bossy mechanism, no agent can aﬀect the bundle consumed by any other
agent without aﬀecting the bundle consumed by her. Notice that, in our framework, either
budget balance plus two agents or envy-free implies non-bossy.
4Schummer [24] has shown results similar to ours if preferences are linear in
both goods. He also has shown how to extend these results to domains that
strictly include linear preferences in the case of two agents ([24, Corollary 2,
p. 715]). Our results diﬀer from those in two accounts: Assumptions -we
only need a small domain but at the same time our assumptions on the form
of utility functions are very weak- and methods -our approach is based on
diﬀerential calculus that provides a general approach to deal with incentives
in general NTU domains.
The closest paper to ours is by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [23]. They
prove that any Non-Bossy, strategy-proof mechanism deﬁn e di na no p e ns e t
in which second order conditions of payoﬀ maximization hold with strict in-
equality (Regularity) and satisfying certain technical properties must yield
serial dictatorship (p. 590, Theorem 1). This result is neither implied, nor
it implies our results: On the one hand the Non-Bossy assumption is im-
plied by our assumptions in Propositions 1 (two agents plus budget balance)
and 2 (envy-freeness) and their set up is more general than our’s. On the
other hand, our assumptions on the domain are generally weaker than those
by SS, for instance our single-crossing assumption is implied by their Reg-
ularity condition (see our comments after Proposition 3), we dispose com-
pletely of the additional technical conditions that are diﬃcult to interpret
and obtain sharper results -Dictatorship, lack of Envy-Freeness or Individual
Rationality- instead of Serial Dictatorship.
Several questions remain open. For instance the study of the performance
of mechanisms when the equilibrium concept is Bayesian Equilibrium. Also,
in a TU domain with more than two agents, there are strategy-proof, non-
dictatorial and eﬃcient mechanisms in restricted domains (see Groves and
Loeb [9] and Tian [26]). We do not know if a similar result may occur in
other subdomains of a NTU domain. All these are left for future research.
Two sections follow. Section 2 presents the model and some deﬁnitions.
Section 3 presents our main results.
2 The Model
There are I agents. Let y ∈ R+ be the amount of the public good
and xi ∈ R+ the consumption of the private good (money). Let ω be the
a g g r e g a t ee n d o w m e n to ft h ep r i v a t eg o o d .W ew i l lc o n s i d e rt w oc a s e s :o n ei n
w h i c he a c ha g e n ti privately owns an initial endowment of the private good
5ωi ∈ R++ and so ω =
S
i ωi,a n dt h ec a s ei nw h i c hω is publicly owned by
all agents. An allocation is a vector a =( y,x1,...,xI).
We assume that all the relevant functions are twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable.








and where θi,t h et y p eo fa g e n ti, is drawn from an interval Θi =( θi,θi) ⊂ R.





is strictly monotonic in θi, i.e. the so-called Spence-Mirrless single-crossing
property.3 This property guarantees that for each agent and for any pair of
preferences, her associated indiﬀerence curves cross just once (in Proposition
3 the single-crossing property will be derived from another assumption).
In Proposition 1 we consider preferences that are representable by a utility
function of the form Ui(a,θi)=H(y)+vi(xi,θi),w h e r eH(·) and vi(·) are
concave and strictly increasing, and
∂vi(·,θi)
∂xi is strictly monotonic in θi,f o r
every i. These preferences are also representable by the utility function
Ui(a,θi)=Fi(θi)f(y)+gi(xi,θi) with Fi(·) > 0. T w oe x a m p l e so ft h i sc l a s so f
utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, Ui(a,θi)=yαi(θi)x
βi(θi)
i , or quasi-linear,
Ui(a,θi)=θif(y)+xi with θi > 0.4
A vector θ =( θ1,θ2,...,θI) will be called an economy.T h e s p a c e o f a l l
possible economies is denoted by Θ =
TI
i=1 Θi. The cost function, denoted
by c(·), is also twice continuously diﬀerentiable with c (y) > 0,a n dc  (y) ≥ 0,
for every y. The set of feasible allocations is
A ≡ {(y,x1,...,xI):y ∈ R+,x i ∈ R+ for all i,
I [
i=1
xi + c(y) ≤ ω}.
An allocation (y,x1,...,xI) is Individually Rational if Ui(y,xi,θi) ≥
Ui(0,ωi,θi) for all i.
3This property plays an important role in other parts of economics, e.g. signalling.
4Not every quasi-linear utility function can be written in the way we assumed above.
6A Social Choice Function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → A. We will write
f(·)=( y(·),x 1(·),...,xI(·)). AS C Ff(·) is Budget Balanced (BB) if,
I [
i=1
xi(θ)+c(y(θ)) = ω, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
AS C Ff(·) is Pareto Eﬃcient (PE) if there is no economy θ =( θ1,...,θI)
and feasible allocation a ∈ A such that Ui(a,θi) ≥ Ui(f(θ),θi) for every i,
and Ui(a,θi) >U i(f(θ),θi) for some i. If an allocation is PE and interior (see
Campbell and Truchon [4] and Conley and Diamantaras [6] for non-interior





















Let ∆ be the I−1 unit simplex and int(∆) be the interior of the I−1 unit
simplex. Under our assumptions, a SCF f(·) is PE if there exist I functions
α1(·),...,αI(·) ∈ ∆ such that, for every economy θ =( θ1,...,θI),









AP a r e t oe ﬃcient SCF is non-dictatorial if αi(·)  =1 , for any i and non-
exclusive if in the above maximization α1(·),...,αI(·) ∈ int(∆). With I =2
non-exclusive and non-dictatorial are equivalent. A SCF is Envy-Free if for
each economy it selects an allocation in which no agent prefers the bundle
consumed by any other agent (see Foley [7]). In our case it is equivalent
to require that the consumption of all agents is the same. Envy-Free is an
appropriate requirement for economies in which the property of the private
7good is common.5 Finally, a SCF is Individually Rational (IR) if for each
economy it selects individually rational allocations. This is an appropriate
requirement for economies in which the property of the private good is private
and agents have the option of not participating in the mechanism.
The previous concepts are illustrated by the example below which serves
to appreciate the diﬀerences between a TU and a NTU domain.
Example 1 Let I =2 , ui = y + F(θi)x
β















Thus, in this case PE does not determine the level of the public good, but a













Let Si denote the agent i’s set of possible actions or messages.
A mechanism Γ =( S1,...,S I,g(·)) is a collection of I sets (S1,...,SI) and
an outcome function g : S1 × ... × SI → A.
A strategy for player i is a function si : Θi → Si, that gives the action
chosen by i for each type θi.




s =( si,s −i),
S−i = S1 × ...Si−1 × Si+1 × ...SI,
S = Si × S−i.
5An alternative motivation for this property is that any anonymous and coalition-proof
mechanism yields no-envy allocations, see Moulin [19, p.310].
8The strategy proﬁle s∗(·)=( s∗
1(·),...,s∗
I(·)) is a dominant strategy equilib-
rium of mechanism Γ =( S1,...,S I,g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Ui(g(s
∗
i(θi),s −i),θi) ≥ Ui(g(s
 
i,s −i),θi),
for all s 
i ∈ Si and all s−i ∈ S−i.
The mechanism Γ =( S1,...,SI,g(·)) implements the SCF f in dominant
strategies if every dominant strategy equilibrium s∗(·)=( s∗
1(·),...,s∗
I(·)) of
mechanism Γ is such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ), for each economy θ ∈ Θ.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism in which Si = Θi for all i and the
outcome function is the SCF to be implemented, i.e. g(·)=f(·).
The SCF f(·) is dominant strategies incentive compatible (DSIC) (or
strategy-proof) if s∗
i(θi)=θi is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the direct
mechanism Γ =( Θ1,...,ΘI,f(·)) for all θi ∈ Θi and i =1 ,...,I.B y t h e
Revelation Principle if a SCF is implementable in dominant strategies, it is
DSIC.
Consider now the following example of a well-known mechanism.
Example 2 (A voluntary contribution game).6 Let si = xi. Assume that
Ui(y,xi,θi)=y+vi(si,θi) and that the public good is produced under constant
returns to scale, y = k
SI




(ωi − si)+vi(si,θi),i =1 ,...,I,





Notice that: 1) The contribution game has a dominant strategy. 2) If
∂vi(ωi,θi)
∂si <
k, agent i makes a positive contribution in equilibrium and 3) the level of the
public good is smaller than any level compatible with Pareto eﬃciency, i.e.
agents free-ride (the ﬁrst two assertions follow directly from ﬁrst order con-
dition of payoﬀ maximization, a proof of the last assertion can be obtained
from the authors upon request).7 We remark that in the standard quasi-linear
6An overview of these games is provided by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian [2].
7These characteristics were ﬁrst noticed by Keser [14] for a special case of the utility
functions assumed in this example.
9framework 1) and 2) are not true: In particular, only one agent makes a posi-
tive contribution (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [18, pp. 361-2]).
Thus, the preferences in this example are suited to capture situations where
free riding does not take the extreme form that it does in a TU domain.8
3 Results
In this section we gather our main ﬁndings. Let us begin by proving three
lemmas which characterize the properties of strategy-proof, non-exclusive
and eﬃcient SCF. In these lemmas, we assume that a SCF is deﬁned in an
open set Θ in which utility functions can be written as H(y)+vi(xi,θi),
where H(·) and vi(·) are concave and strictly increasing, the consumption of
both the private and the public good is positive for each agent and
∂vi(·,θi)
∂xi is
strictly monotonic in θi for every i, i.e. the single crossing assumption.
Lemma 1: If a non-exclusive SCF f(·)=( y(·),x 1(·),...,x I(·)) is PE and









,f o re v e r yi =1 ,...,I and every θ ∈ Θ.( 1 )
Proof. If a non-exclusive SCF f(·)=( y(·),x 1(·),...,xI(·)) is PE, from the
ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization of
SI
i=1 αi(θ)[H(y)+vi(xi,θi)] over SI













xi(θ)+c(y(θ)) = ω. (3)
8We may wonder if the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) is not Pareto domi-
nated for other DSIC mechanism in a non-negligible subdomain of the domain considered
in this example. Without further assumptions this conjecture is not true: Consider the
conﬁscatory mechanism in which, no matter what, y = w. If the number of agents is
large enough the conﬁscatory mechanism Pareto dominates the VCM because the loss of
utility caused by zero consumption of money is compensated by the amount of the public
good received in the conﬁscatory mechanism. Therefore, the question is: Are there non
constant DSIC mechanisms that Pareto dominate VCM?










=0 .( 4 )
Now, by diﬀerentiating condition (3) with respect to θi we have that, for









=0 .( 5 )
From conditions (2), (4), and (5) the result follows.
Next two Lemmas deal with the two person case. In order to simplify
notation, we will write α1(·)=α(·) and α2(·)=1− α(·).
Lemma 2. Let I =2 . Suppose that f(·) is a non-dictatorial SCF that is
PE and DSIC with associated function α(·) ∈ int(∆). Then, the solution of
the PDE (1) can be written as a C1 function of α(·).
Proof. If f(·)=( y(·),x 1(·),x 2(·)) is a non-dictatorial SCF that is both PE
and DSIC, then, by Lemma 1, the functions x1(·) and x2(·) have to satisfy the
system of partial diﬀerential equations (1) for some function α(·) ∈ int(∆),

















If there exist functions x1(·) and x2(·) that solve the above equations, by
diﬀerentiating with respect to θ2 in (6) and with respect to θ1 in (7), these





















































=0 ,( 8 )
which is a linear partial diﬀerential equation in x2.

















Then, by diﬀerentiating with respect to θ2 in (9) and with respect to θ1 in
(10), and applying an analogous reasoning of symmetry of the second cross















which is a linear partial diﬀerential equation in x1.
The solution to Equations (8) and (11) is found in Zachmanouglou and
Thoe [28, pp. 62, Example 2.2 and Problem 2.3] and is given by
x1(θ)=h1(α(θ))
x2(θ)=h2(α(θ)).
Where hi(·) is an arbitrary C1 function of a single variable and α(θ)=c
is the general solution of the ordinary diﬀerential equation associated with
both Equation (8) and Equation (11).9,10
By BB we can also write
y(θ)=g(α(θ)) = c
−1(ω − h1(α(θ)) − h2(α(θ))).
9The bridge between the notation in Zachmanouglou and Thoe [28] and ours is: x = θ1,








∂θ1 ,z= x1 in (11) and z = x2 in (8).




∂θ2 dθ2 =0and trivially α(θ)=c is its general solution.
12All these establish the result.
Lemma 3. Let I =2 . Suppose that f(·) is a non-dictatorial, PE and DSIC
SCF with an associated function α ∈ int(∆). Then,
∂α(θ)
∂θi  =0 ,i=1 ,2.
Proof. Suppose that
∂α(θ)
∂θi =0 , some i,s a yi =1 . By PE (Equation (2) in










Diﬀerentiating (2’) with respect to θ1 w es e et h a tt h el e f th a n ds i d ei s



























Therefore equation (2’) does not hold for all θ and we obtain a contradic-
tion. A similar argument can be done with θ2 and so the proof follows.
With these lemmas in hand we prove the following result.
Proposition 1: When I =2there is no PE, DSIC and non-dictatorial
SCF deﬁned on any open Θ in which utility functions can be written as
H(y)+vi(xi,θi), where H(·) and vi(·) are concave and strictly increasing,
the single-crossing assumption holds and the consumption of the private and
the public good is positive for each agent.
Proof. Suppose there exists a SFC f(·)=( y(·),x 1(·),x 2(·)) that is PE,
DSIC and non-dictatorial in some open set Θ w i t ht h ep r o p e r t i e sr e q u i r e d




∂θi  =0 ,i=1 ,2. Now consider a change in both θ1 and θ2









13But again (applying the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3) the
single-crossing assumption plus the fact that, although both θ1 and θ2 have
changed α has not changed, imply that Equation (2’) can not hold.
A sp o i n t e do u tb yG r o v e sa n dL o e b[ 9 ] ,P E ,n o n - d i c t a t o r s h i pa n dD S I C
a r ec o m p a t i b l ei ns m a l ld o m a i n sw h e nI>2. Thus, in economies with more
than two agents we strengthened the requirement of non-dictatorship to that
of Envy-Freeness or Individual Rationality.
Proposition 2: When #I>2, there is no PE, DSIC and Envy-Free SCF
deﬁned on any open set Θ in which the single-crossing assumption holds and
the consumption of the private and the public good is positive for each agent.
Proof. Clearly, if an allocation is Envy-Free it is non-exclusive. If a non-
exclusive SCF f(·)=( y(·),x 1(·),...,xI(·)) is both PE and DSIC then, rea-

















As we noticed before, envy-freeness implies that xi(θ)=x(θ), for every i














, for every i and θ.
























 (y) for every i and θ.
Suppose that there is an economy θ for which
∂x(θ)
∂θi  =0 ,∀i =1 ,...,I. By
continuity of x(·) there is a set V,f o rw h i c h
∂x(ˆ θ)
∂θi  =0 ,∀ˆ θ ∈ V. >From the













, for every i  = j, for all e θ ∈ V.
Perturbing θj and θk,k,j = i in such a way that x(ˆ θ) -and therefore y(ˆ θ)−
remains constant we see that the single-crossing property implies that the
previous equation can not hold. Thus
∂x(θ)













∂θi =0for some i.














∂θi =0 ,t h es i n g l e -
crossing property is contradicted.
Finally we substitute the requirement of f being Envy-Free by the as-
sumption that f is Individually Rational (IR).
We need some extra deﬁnitions and notation. A SCF f is Weakly Regular
(WR) at θ
  if there is an agent, say i, for whom to tell the truth implies that
second order conditions of payoﬀ maximization hold with strict inequality at
θ










≡ Ω(θ,˜ θi)=0 (12)
where θ is the economy announced by agents and ˜ θi i st h et r u et y p eo fi.






< 0, when ˜ θi = θ
 
i.
The WR condition is a much weaker version of an assumption called
Regularity (R) by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [23, p. 590]. R requires
15that second order conditions hold strictly for all economies and all agents.
The relationship of R and WR with the single-crossing property is deferred
after the proof of our next result.
Finally, let ˆ θ be an economy such that (0,ω1,ω2,...,ωI) is PE and there
is, at least one agent with non linear indiﬀerence curves.
Proposition 3: There is no DSIC and IR SCF deﬁn e do na no p e ns e tΘ
with ˆ θ ∈ Θ that is WR and PE at ˆ θ.
Proof. We ﬁrst see that if f(ˆ θ) is a PE allocation, it must be that f(ˆ θ)=
(0,ω1,ω2,...,ωI). Notice that any other PE allocation is such that either
some agents have less utility than in (0,ω1,ω2,...,ωI), which contradicts that
f is IR or such that all agents are indiﬀerent. In the latter case, a convex
combination of this allocation and (0,ω1,ω2,...,ωI) can improve the utility
of, at least, one individual, contradicting that (0,ω1,ω2,...,ωI) is PE.






=0for ˜ θi = θi.
Since f is WR at ˆ θ we have that for ˜ θi = ˆ θi,
∂Ω(ˆ θ,˜ θi)
















∂θi =0 , Equation (12) above imply that
∂y(ˆ θ)
∂θi =0and the previ-
ous equation can not hold. Thus,
∂xi(ˆ θ)
∂θi  =0 . Therefore, there is a θ
 
i in a
neighborhood of ˆ θi such that xi(θ
 














i,ˆ θ−i) ≥ 0 and xi(θ
 





i,ˆ θ−i),ˆ θi) >U i(0,ωi,ˆ θi)=Ui(f(ˆ θ),ˆ θi).





i,ˆ θ−i),ˆ θj) ≥ Uj(0,ωj,ˆ θj)=Uj(f(ˆ θ),ˆ θj).
16But this contradicts that f is PE at θ = ˆ θ.
Notice that, in contrast with other results in the literature, we only as-
sume that f selects PE allocations at θ = ˆ θ. Also, the WR assumption can
be disposed with at the cost of considering a special domain of preferences
(a proof is available under request).
We now prove that DSIC and WR imply that the single-crossing assump-
tion holds around ˆ θi for agent i. A similar argument can be used to show
that DSIC and R implies the single crossing assumption.
Notice that FOC of DSIC can be written as








) ≡ Ω(ˆ θ,˜ θi)=0 ,
where MRSi(ˆ θ,˜ θi) ≡
∂Ui(y(ˆ θ),xi(ˆ θ),˜ θi)
∂y
∂Ui(y(ˆ θ),xi(ˆ θ),˜ θi)
∂xi
.
Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that DSIC and WR imply that
∂Ω(ˆ θ,˜ θi)




















> 0, for ˜ θi = ˆ θi.
Notice that
∂Ui(y(ˆ θ),xi(ˆ θ),˜ θi)









Then, from the inequality above,









∂xi  =0 , i.e. that the single-crossing condition holds
around ˆ θi for agent i.
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